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Diversity and Immigration 
Edward F? Lazear 
A growing number of  studies are attempting to document the effect of 
immigration on wages of native-born Americans.’ The emphasis has been 
on a corollary of standard trade theory. The idea is that the immigrant is 
paid his marginal product. The inframarginal returns are captured by the 
complementary factors of production, in this case, natives, who own the 
capital and complementary labor. The focus on wage effects of immigra- 
tion is a natural consequence. 
Most proponents of immigration, however, argue for the diversity value 
that immigration confers on the United States. The stew tastes better when 
the ingredients are varied. The notion that the whole is greater than the 
sum of the parts derives from interactions between factors that somehow 
add to creativity or other components of output not captured by the stan- 
dard production function. 
There is something to this argument. It would be surprising to find large 
gains from immigration associated with bringing in more skilled or un- 
skilled workers. Skill is easily arbitraged by  new native-born entrants to 
the labor market. The limit on the difference between the gains to bringing 
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1. Borjas (1994) points out that the gains from immigration accrue to the native population 
precisely when wages are depressed by  the entry of immigrants. Studies of  the effects of 
immigrants on natives’ wages include LaLonde and Tope1 (1991) and Card (1990). The stud- 
ies generally find small, if any, effects of immigration on the wages of natives. 
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in a skilled versus an unskilled immigrant is the cost of producing a skilled 
worker from an unskilled one domestically. 
In the traditional  model,  the gain from immigration  results  from in- 
creases in the population, which enhances the value of capital or other 
factors owned by natives. There is nothing special about immigration. The 
argument in favor of immigration is identical to arguing that society bene- 
fits when everyone has more children because the child will only capture 
his marginal product. Inframarginal returns flow to capital and other la- 
bor owned by his parents or their contemporaries. Selecting the skill level 
of immigrants is equivalent to determining whether we want more children 
who will grow up to be skilled workers or unskilled workem2 
Even if constant returns to scale prevails, and even if each immigrant 
brings with him a proportionate amount of new capital, land is fixed and 
owned by the native population. Any population increase, native born or 
immigrant driven, causes the value of land to rise, benefiting the native 
population. 
Fans of immigration might claim that this misses the point. It is possible 
to argue that gains from immigration derive from having a wider economic 
“gene pool.” With less “inbreeding,”  our ideas may be better  and more 
creative and we  are less likely to exacerbate our mistakes. Although it is 
politically correct to accept the view that diversity provides benefit, there 
are few studies to document the magnitude of the gains or even that such 
gains exist.’ 
Diversity surely carries its costs. Because individuals from different cul- 
tures have a more difficult time communicating with one another, diversity 
reduces trade, at least initially. Lazear (forthcoming) analyzed the effects 
of diversity on trade reduction but ignored any gains to diversity, per se. 
If the value of diversity is sufficiently large, then perhaps some of the argu- 
ments against a heterogeneous workforce could be mitigated or reversed. 
The analysis that follows attempts to take the diversity argument seri- 
ously. In some sense, it seems a reductio ad absurdum, both at the theoreti- 
cal  and empirical  levels.  The conclusion  is  not  that  certain  countries 
should be favored because of  their contribution  to diversity, but rather 
that the current policy, which has the effect of favoring certain countries, 
does not enhance diversity. An alternative policy that leads to more bal- 
anced immigration would further diversity. 
2. There is an additional factor. Since parents may care about the well-being of their chil- 
dren more than they do  about the well-being of an anonymous immigrant, the wages of the 
child may enter into the calculation of happiness for the native parent population. 
3. See O’Reilly, Williams,  and Barsade (1998), who find that the gains from diversity are 
in fact negative. Because diversity creates conflict, any creativity gains are swamped by those 
associated with the conflict itself. 
Weitzman (1992) models biodiversity. He finds that society does not subsidize the right 
species in maximizing biodiversity. Other factors, including the “cuteness” of  the animal in 
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The theoretical analysis builds on the idea that the gains from diversity 
are greatest when groups have information sets that are di~joint,~  that are 
relevant to one another, and that can be learned by the other group at low 
A more formal model will be presented below, but the intuition can 
be stated verbally. 
First, the diversity gains are greatest when individuals have different 
information. If information sets are completely disjoint, then members of 
group A can learn a great deal from group B that they do not already 
know. If information sets are completely overlapping, then the two groups 
do not contribute much to each other’s knowledge. 
Second, the information possessed by the other group must be relevant. 
For example, the knowledge that an auto mechanic has is quite different 
from that held by  an economist. The information sets are quite distinct 
and thereby meet the disjointness criterion. But they are not relevant to 
one another. Knowing how to repair the differential on a 1963 Buick is 
unlikely to help an economist analyze wage differentials. 
Third, even if information sets are disjoint and relevant, they are useless 
unless they can be understood by the other group. For example, it might 
be better to express a particular thought in French than in English, but in 
order for English speakers to get the benefit of this improvement, they 
must  be able to understand  French themselves. If  it were prohibitively 
costly to learn the language or obtain the information possessed by  the 
other group, then disjointedness and relevance would have no value. 
Diversity is modeled and applied to analyze the choice a country makes 
about the identity of immigrants. Data from the 1990 census are used to 
estimate the parameters of the model. The findings are as follows: 
1. The current U.S. immigrant flow is inconsistent  with diversity. To 
obtain gains from diversity, it would be necessary to institute a selective 
immigration  policy that  eliminates relative-based preferences for immi- 
grants and replaces them with a much more targeted approach. Current 
American residents may have preferences for their own relatives, per se, 
but the diversity argument for immigration does not bolster their claims. 
2.  Ironically, a preference for diversity does not imply a diverse popula- 
tion. When trade with unlike individuals is more valuable than trade with 
like individuals, the initial population may prefer a homogeneous popula- 
tion of the opposite type. Sale of immigration slots or other transfers may 
be  able to induce the initial population to prefer a heterogeneous popu- 
lation. 
3.  Groups differ greatly in communication propensity, disjointness, and 
relevance, the three criteria by which a diverse population can be judged. 
4. Hong and Page (1997) focus on the gains from diversity that come about when different 
5. An informal presentation of these ideas is put forth in Lazear (1998, 310-15). 
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The current group of immigrants does not do well by any of these criteria. 
It is possible to select immigrants on the basis of characteristics that would 
enhance diversity and be consistent with the preferences of the majority 
of the initial population. 
4.  Education is an important characteristic, both on the basis of rele- 
vance and for communication. As such, an immigration policy that fails 
to ration slots by price while ignoring the education of immigrants is un- 
likely to further welfare-enhancing diversity. 
5. Immigration policy, more than the underlying characteristics of the 
countries from which the immigrants are drawn, determines the quality of 
immigrants observed in the United States. Because the filters are different 
across groups, immigrants from Japan have lower average levels of educa- 
tion than immigrants from Northern African countries, which is inconsis- 
tent with differences in average levels of education in the countries them- 
selves. 
6. Balanced  immigration,  which  increases the speed of  assimilation, 
also raises gains from diversity. 
3.1  The Model 
Let us suppose that there are two groups, A and B.  The members of 
group A have knowledge that spans an interval A, to A,,  while the mem- 
bers of group B have knowledge that spans an interval B, to B,. The inter- 
vals may be overlapping and the ordering is not important. It is the size 
of the interval and its overlap that is most important. For simplicity, we 
reduce knowledge to a scalar variable, x.  This is shown in figure 3.1. For 
example, suppose that the information in question relates to literatures. 
Then A knows all of the papers on interval A, B knows all of the papers 
on interval B, and they both know papers on interval AB. As in Lazear 
(forthcoming), the model is one of random encounter. An individual can 
encounter one individual per period. This individual is either an A or a B. 
Initially assume that individuals encounter others based on their propor- 
tions in the population-that  is; there is no segregation of groups. When 
an A encounters another A, he can trade with each A receiving surplus 
equal to 
(1)  Surplus toeachA  =  A, - A, 
Trade with another A can yield surplus because two heads or bodies may 
be better than one, even when they have the same skills or information. 
For example, it might be impossible for one person to push a stalled car, 
but two individuals can complete the task. 
When a B encounters another B, she can trade with the B,  and each B 
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Fig. 3.1  Knowledge 
(2)  Surplus to each B  =  B, - B,. 
Trade between A’s  and B’s  may create more or less surplus than trade 
between homogeneous individuals. The surplus could be greater in a het- 
erogeneous pair than in a homogeneous one because the information sets 
do not overlap completely.6 In this situation, A learns  B’s  information, 
which enhances the value of the trade. If B’s information were as valuable 
to A as another A’s information, and vice versa, then trade with a B would 
yield each trader B, -  A, of surplus, which exceeds the value of trade 
between two homogeneous individuals. The less overlap in information 
sets, the better. This illustrates that trade is enhanced when the informa- 
tion sets of trading parties are disjoint. 
Trade between A’s  and B’s  might create less surplus than trade between 
homogeneous pairs. If the information that B’s possess is irrelevant to A’s 
activity, then an encounter with a B would not be valuable to an A. Define 
8 as a relevance parameter. When 8 = 1, everything that B knows is relevant 
to A. Then a trade between an A and a B yields surplus B, -  A, to each 
trading party. When 8 = 0, nothing that B knows is relevant to A. It is 
possible to define 8 as unidirectional. Just because B’s information is rele- 
vant to A does not mean that A’s  information is relevant to B. Allowing 
group-specific relevance parameters would add some realism, but the pos- 
sibility is ignored to conserve on n~tation.~  In general, then, surplus be- 
tween an A and a B who can communicate with one another is given by 
(3)  Surplus to each party from diversified trade  =  8(B, - A,). 
Third, even if B’s  information is different and relevant to A, B and A 
must be able to communicate in order to share the information.8 If A and 
B speak different languages, then either A must learn to speak B or B 
must learn to speak A (or both) in order to share information. Thus, dis- 
6.  It is assumed that B,, is never greater than A,  to simplify the algebra. This is inessential 
to any of the results. 
7.  Logic places a lower bound on 8.  If communication were not an issue, then the propor- 
tion of B’s  information that overlaps with A’s  information must be relevant in order to be 
consistent with the notion that trade between two A’s  yields value A, -  A, to each party. 
Since the overlap is A, -  B,,, the lower bound on 8 is (A, -  B,,) / (B, -  A,). 
8. This is related to the “committee” problem. A large committee possesses more informa- 
tion than any of its individual members, but as the committee gets larger, it becomes impos- 
sible to communicate the information. One individual’s words drown out another’s. This is 
discussed in Lazear (1998, especially ch. 12). 122  Edward P.  Lazear 
jointness, relevance, and communication costs determine the value of di- 
versity. 
The costliness of communication is modeled by  assuming that there is 
a cost, k,, for individual  i to learn the other language. The distribution 
function of k is G,(k) among the A's, and G,(k) among the B's.  It is pos- 
sible that G,  and G,  are identical, but it is also possible that it is easier for 
B's  to learn A than for A's to learn B, or the converse. 
It is now possible to determine how many individuals will learn A and 
how many will learn B. This depends on the probability of encountering 
an individual from the opposite group, on the costs of learning, and on 
the proportion of the opposite group that is bilingual. There is no need 
for English speakers to learn Spanish if  all Spanish speakers also speak 
English. 
Assume only one period. Given that p  of the population is A and 1  -p 
is B, the expected surplus to a monolingual A is then 
Expected surplus to monolingual A 
=  P('4, - '4,)  + (1 - P)G,*WB, - A,), 
(4) 
G; is the equilibrium proportion of B's  who can speak A. The first term 
on the right-hand side is the probability of meeting an A times the surplus 
associated with meeting an A. The second term on the right-hand side 
reflects the probability of meeting a B times the surplus associated with 
meeting a B who can speak A, which depends on disjointness and rele- 
vance. 
Further, the expected surplus to a bilingual A is 
Expected surplus to bilingual A 
=  P(A, - A,) + (1 - p)O(B, - '4,)  - k,, 
(5) 
because all encounters with B's  result in trade. Note that the cost of learn- 
ing B is subtracted from the gains from trade. 
Analogously, the expected surplus to a monolingual B is 
and to a bilingual B, 
Expected surplus to bilingual B 
= (1 - p)(B, - B,) +  pe(B, - A,) - k,. 
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3.2  Gains from Diversity 
Since A's  are in the majority, and since most A's, as an empirical matter, 
are monolingual, at least in the current stock of Americans, let us consider 
whether a monolingual A prefers to meet an A or a B.  This gets to the 
heart of the diversity issue. Normalize A, -  A, to be equal to 1. Assume, 
initially, that B, -  B, is equal to A, -  A, so that A's and B's  receive the 
same value from trading among themselves. 
The difference between meeting a B and an A to a monolingual A is 
given by 
Difference in value of meeting a B instead of an A 
=  0G,*(B, - A,) - (A, - A,) 
0G,*(2 - A) - 1, 
(7) 
= 
where A is defined as A, -  B, and is a measure of overlap, which is the 
complement of disjointne~s.~ 
The intuitive statements made earlier come directly from differentiating 
equation (7). First note that 
a/aA  = -0G,*+  0(2 - A)aG,*/aA. 
Both terms are negative because aG,*/aA is negative (from eq. [9] below), 
As overlap decreases, for example, disjointness increases, and so does the 
gain to diversity. When A's can learn more from B's,  they are more anxious 
to encounter B's. 
Second. 
aiae  =  ~32  - A) +  0(2 - ~)a~,*/ae. 
Both terms are positive because aG,*/a0 is positive (from eq. [9] below). 
As relevance rises, so does the advantage of meeting a B over an A. 
Third, 
aiaq  =  0(2 - A)  2 0. 
When more B's  can communicate with A's, the gain to a monolingual A 
from meeting a B is greater. The cost of learning A is a key determinant 
of G,*, so as more B's find it cheap to learn A, group A's  gains from diver- 
sity rise.', 
9. If A's  and B's were identical and all B's  spoke A, then I3  would equal 1, A would equal 
1, and this expression would be equal to zero. 
10. Differentiating with respect to G*,  should be interpreted as a change in the underlying 
costs of  learning a language, which  shows up as a change in the equilibrium  number  of 
individuals who are bilingual. 124  Edward P.  Lazear 
Now, the names A and B are arbitrary, except that A's have been defined 
to be the majority  by  declaring that p  > l/2.  But nothing in the above 
derivation has relied on the fact that p > l/2.  Thus, all statements that 
relate to A's  also relate to B's.  Specifically, B's  prefer to interact with A'S 
when A is low. That is, group A's  information is disjoint from group B's 
information in the sense that A's know much that B's do  not know. Further, 
B's  preference for interaction with A rises with 0, the relevance of A's infor- 
mation. Finally, as G;,  the proportion  of A's who can speak B,  rises, B's 
preference for A's rises. Again, as the cost to A's of learning B declines, the 
B's  gain from diversity rises. 
3.3  Parochialism 
It is useful to consider the conditions under which B's  learn A and vice 
versa. When are groups cosmopolitan and when are they parochial? First, 
let us consider when a member of  the minority will learn A. Taking the 
difference of equations (6) and (5), the gain to a B from becoming bilin- 
gual is 
(8)  Gain to aB  fromlearningA  =  pO(1 - GZ)(B, - A,) - k,, 
so that the proportion of B's  who learn A are those for whom the right- 
hand side is positive.  Since the distribution function among B's  of  k,  is 
G,(k,), the proportion of B's who learn A is 
(9) 
Analogously, 
Proportion of B's who learn A = G,[p  O(l -  GZ)(B,  -  41. 
(10)  Proportion of A's who learn B = GA[(l  -  p)  O(1 -  G,*)(B,  -  A,)]. 
By  differentiating equations (9) and (lo), the following results obtain 
under general conditions.'l 
First, an increase in p, the proportion  of A's  in the population,  raises 
the proportion  of B's  who learn A. This is the primary result  of  Lazear 
(forthcoming). Because there are more A's in the population, being able to 
speak A allows B to trade with more individuals, which is particularly 
important when B is a small minority and A is a large majority. 
Second, the larger is 0, the greater is the proportion of B's who learn A. 
When A's  knowledge is relevant, it pays for B to learn A. 
Third, the smaller is G;,  the more likely is B to learn A. A small value 
of GZ  means that few A's  speak B. Thus, the only way for B to trade with 
A is for B to learn A. 
1  1. The necessary condition is that p(  1  ~  p)  A202G,G,  < 1, which is certain to hold as p 
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Finally, the proportion of B's  who learn A increases in B, -  A,,  which 
equals 2 -  A. As the region of information overlap falls-that  is, as dis- 
jointness rise-so  does the value of trading with an A. B types are more 
likely to learn A when the overlap in information is small. 
The population becomes less parochial when disjointness of informa- 
tion is large, when the other group's information is relevant, and when the 
cost of communication is low. 
3.4  Diversity and the Choice of Immigrant Type 
It is now possible to consider the primary question. Is there a diversity 
case for immigration? Let us start by determining which type of individual 
a country would like to have immigrate. 
Initially, there are four types of people in the country. They are monolin- 
gual A's, bilingual A's,  monolingual B's,  and bilingual B's.  We  assume an 
egalitarian social welfare function that treats each individual equally and 
maximizes the sum of surplus across all individuals. 
Initially, there are a  A's  and (1 -  a)  B's.  The equilibrium population 
will have p A's and (1 -  p)  B's.  The goal is to choose p so as to maximize 
the welfare of the initial population. Utility of immigrants is ignored.I2 
The utility of an A is given by 
a. Utility of monolingual A = p(A, -  A,)  + (1 -  p)G,*  B(B, -  A,), 
b. Utility of bilingual A = p(A, -  A,)  + (1 -  p) 8(B, -  A,) -  k,, 
(1 1) 
and that of a B is given by 
a. Utility of monolingual B = (1 -  p)(B, -  B,) + pGZ 8(B, -  A,), 
b. Utility of bilingual B = (1 -  p)(B, -  B,) + p O(B, -  A,) -  ki 
(12) 
Since there are a  A's  and (1 -  a)  B's,  the expected utility of the initial 
population as a function of p, the equilibrium proportions, is 
12. This is  not unreasonable since immigrants who come voluntarily are at least made 
better off  by  immigration. Further, since they can choose among many countries, competi- 
tion will  induce them  to go  to the country that provides the best ratio  for them,  other 
things constant. 126  Edward P.  Lazear 
where GZ  and G,* refer to the equilibrium proportions of A's and B's  who 
learn the other group's language where k, and kB  are the conditional ex- 
pectations of k,,  the average cost of learning the language for A's and B's, 
respectively, given that they learn the other language. The four terms re- 
flect the utilities of monolingual A's,  bilingual A's,  monolingual B's,  and 
bilingual B's,  weighted by their proportions in population.  I3 
To find the optimum p,  it is necessary to differentiate equation (1  3)  with 
respect  to p. Intuition  is gained,  however, by  considering  some specific 
cases. First, suppose that it is too costly for either A's or B's  to learn the 
other group's language. Then, GZ  = G,* = 0, and equation (13) becomes 
v(A,  - A,,) + (1 -  - p)(B, - B,,). 
Differentiating with respect to p  yields 
- 
which is positive as long as a/(l -  a)  > (B, -  B,)/(A, -  A,,). For B, -  B, 
d  A, -  A,, this is guaranteed because a  >  l/2.  Then a/ap is always positive, 
which means that the optimum level ofp  is 1. If society were to seek immi- 
grants, it would want those who mimic the majority. Under these circum- 
stances, there is no diversity case for immigration. In fact, the reverse is 
true. Immigration  is valuable,  but it is because immigration  of majority 
types would increase homogeneity in society. Homogeneity is the desired 
outcome when  individuals  cannot trade with members  of  the opposite 
group. Because the A's cannot speak B and the B's  cannot speak A, it is 
best to have only one type of individual. Since A's are initially the majority, 
welfare maximization  implies  admitting  only  A's.  Under these circum- 
stances, B's ,  who cannot communicate with A's, will push for more B's.  A 
consequence is that quite divergent  views about immigration  policy are 
likely to result. 
The divergence in views is, in part, a result  of linearity built  into the 
model. There are no diminishing returns to A's from getting more A's. The 
gains from trade are independent of the number of individuals who have 
the relevant  skills. If diminishing returns were allowed, corner solutions 
would be less likely. In particular, it is reasonable that a small group might 
derive more from an additional member with whom it could trade than a 
large group. Being alone is quite different  from having  one friend. The 
one-hundred-and-first friend makes less difference to one's life than the 
first. If so, then arguments in favor of the majority type to the exclusion 
of the minority are weakened. Indeed, in an economy where side payments 
13. The proportions, G, depend on equilibrium levels, whereas OL is the fixed, initial pro- 
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are possible (say, by  buying immigration rights), all of the nonlinearities 
would work to affect prices such that an optimal allocation is achieved. 
This is discussed below. 
The strongest case for immigration of minority members can be made 
when disjointness, relevance, and inexpensive learning prevail. Consider, 
then, the other extreme, where the cost of learning the other group's lan- 
guage is zero  for all individuals. Then, G:  = G:  =  l.I4  Equation  (13) 
is then 
a[p(A,  - A,) +  - p)(B, - A011 
+ (1 - a"1  - p)(4 - 4)  +  8P(4 - A0)I. 
Differentiating with respect to p yields 
A,) - 
+ (1 - 4[8(B1  - A,) - (B, - B0)I. 
Suppose, for a moment, that A's  and B's  have equal information. Then 
equation (14) becomes 
-  = (2a - 1)[1 - (B, - A,)8]  a 
aP 
or 
Since 01  > l/2,  the first term is positive. If 8 were zero, so that opposite 
group's information was irrelevant, then a/ap  would always be positive and 
the optimal p  would be 1, as in the case where no one learns the other 
group's language. Suppose, however, that everything that the other group 
knows is relevant, so that 8 = 1. As long as there is any disjointness at 
all-that  is, as long as overlap is not perfect, so that A < 1-the  second 
term is negative, which implies that a/dp <  0 for all values ofp. This means 
that the optimal long-run population would have to be p  = 0. The initial 
population would prefer to allow only B's  to immigrate because A's  get 
more out of B's than they do out of A's and there are more A's  than B's  in 
the initial population. 
This produces a surprising implication. Even if  there were gains from 
diversity that outweighed those of trading with one's own type, the impli- 
cation is that the initial society would want a population of all B's,  not a 
14. In fact, it is only necessary that one group become bilingual. 128  Edward P.  Lazear 
diverse population. Homogeneity would be desired, but it would be homo- 
geneity of types in the minority of the initial population. Furthermore, it 
would be the A's who would prefer this movement to B's;  the B's  would 
prefer an opposite movement to A's. The reason is that A's prefer trading 
with B's,  and vice versa. Since there are more A's initially, their preferences 
win out and the optimum is to admit only B's. 
The implication that the society would switch from a majority of A's to 
unanimity of B's is extreme and is based on the assumption that the initial 
population can commit to an immigration policy that is maintained in the 
future. This is unrealistic. If A's were to insist on bringing in only B's, then 
eventually B's  would become the majority. As soon as they outnumbered 
the A's,  they would prefer more A's  for the same reason that A's  prefer 
more B's.  The majority B's  could then institute a policy of admitting only 
A's, which would hold until A's became the majority, at which point policy 
would reverse to admit  only B's.  The equilibrium  in  a dynamic setting 
where the majority determines immigration policy is to have a society with 
half of each type.15 
The general point is that even when the initial population cares about 
diversity, it prefers a specific population, not necessarily a diverse popula- 
tion. In some cases, the population preferred by the initial diversity-loving 
population  may  be  almost  completely homogeneous.  The immigration 
rule depends on the size and strength of the various groups, but the mes- 
sage is that the case for diversity as it is generally interpreted is question- 
able at best on theoretical grounds. Below, it is shown that the case for the 
current interpretation of diversity fails on empirical grounds as we11.I6 
3.5  Immigration and Income 
Suppose that we  are interested in maximizing GNP or GNP per capita 
by  choosing the number and type of immigrants. Would the solution be 
the same as that derived above? In general, the answer is no, and the dis- 
crepancy between the results in this section and those in the last come 
about  because transfer payments  from one group to another have  not 
been allowed. 
To maximize GNP per capita, it is sufficient to choose p  so as to max- 
imize the net income of the average individual in society, as opposed to 
the net income of the initial population, which was the criterion expressed 
in equation (1 3). To do this, it is necessary to choose p to maximize 
15. The situation is much more complicated when there are more than two types because 
the plurality type prefers a smaller minority group but does not have the power to enforce 
its desires unilaterally. 
16. It is, of course, possible to build in a taste for having a mixed society, just for mixture's 
sake, but there is no underlying reason for this that comes from the usual arguments having 
to do with the value of diversity. The enriching value of dealing with other types of people 
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The only difference between equations (13) and (15) is that a  is replaced 
by p  in (15) to reflect that we  wish to maximize the net income of the 
average individual in society.17 First consider the case where learning is 
free, so that Gi  = GZ  = 1. Also, assume neutrality so that A, -  A, = B, 
-  B, = 1. Then equation (1  5) becomes 
(16)  EU(p) =  p2  + (1 - p)'  +  2pO(l - p)(2 - A). 
Differentiating with respect top  yields 
a/dp  = (4p - 2)[1 - (2 - A)0], 
and again, 
avaZp  =  4[i - (2 - A~I. 
The solution to the first order condition is p  = '/2. This is a maximum 
when (2 -  A)0  > 1, or when trading with unlike individuals has more 
value than trading with like individuals. When diversity has value and is 
free, the optimal solution for the economy is to choose immigrants to 
move in the direction ofp = '/z.  Since (Y > l/2,  this necessarily means that 
minority immigrants are preferred to majority ones. 
This result contrasts with that in the previous section, where the utility 
of the initial population, rather than overall GNP, was allowed. The rea- 
son is this: When trading with unlike individuals is better than trading 
with like individuals, A's  want B's  and B's  want A's.  But since there are 
more A's than B's  in the initial population, maximizing the utility of  the 
initial population pushes the outcome to p = 0, with all B's  (other than 
the initial group of A's). This does not maximize GNP. Since it does not, 
it is inefficient and there is opportunity for trade. One way  to deal with 
the discrepancy is to sell immigration slots, discussed below. 
It is possible that trading with unlike individuals has less value than 
trading with like individuals. Then, the second-order condition implies a 
minimum. Because it was assumed that A's and B's have the same amount 
of knowledge-that  is, A, -  A, = B, -  B, = 1-GNP  is maximized by 
choosing either p  = 0 or p  = 1. The tie is broken when one group has 
more information than another. Suppose, for example, that A's are more 
17. Additionally, k changes because the group of individuals that decides to learn the other 
language varies with the proportion of each type in the overall population. 130  Edward P.  Lazear 
educated than B's and that education is positively correlated with informa- 
tion and the value of trade. Then this would tip the balance in favor of 
A's.  The value of EUb)  in equation (16) would be maximized at p  = 1. 
Allowing A, -  A,  to differ from B, -  B, turns equation (16) into 
+ (1 - P"l  - p)(B, - B,) +  P(2 - All, 
with first-order condition, 
(is)  a/ap = 2p(~,  -  A,) -  2(1- p)(~,  -  B,) + (2 -  +)(2  -  Ale. 
Setting equation (1  8) equal to zero yields 
(B, - B,) - (2 - A)O 
p=-  (A, - A,) + (B, - B,) - 2(2 - A)O' 
which solves for p = l/2  when B's and A's  are symmetric. But if B's  have 
less knowledge than A's, then p moves closer to 1. Some diversity may still 
be desired. For example, if A, -  A,  = 1.5, B, -  B, = .5, A = .25, and 0 
= 1, then the p  that maximizes GNP is 5/6. There is a strong bias toward 
A's, but complete homogeneity is not desirable. 
At the other extreme, when no learning occurs so that  GZ  = G,* = 0, 
equation (1  5) becomes 
EUb) =  $(A,  - A,) + (1 - p12(B, - Bo), 
which is maximized by settingp = 1 if A's know more than B's  andp = 0 
if B's  know more than A's.  The society should be completely homogeneous 
because no trade takes place between unlike individuals.'* 
The conclusion of this section is that without transfer  payments, the 
initial population would actually choose immigrants of the opposite type 
were diversity important. Allowing transfer payments from the new immi- 
grants to the native-born population generally produces an interior solu- 
tion, but one that favors the group with the most information and skill. 
3.6  Selling Immigration Slots 
It has been shown that  diversity-enhancing  immigration may be op- 
posed by  the weighted average individual in the initial pop~lation'~  even 
when it would increase overall GNP. Whenever this occurs, there is room 
for trade. But the ability to buy out the initial population depends on the 
18. A solution is to have the group that gets the most out of  being in  the country "buy 
19. It is also true that it will be opposed by the median voter since A's  are the majority. 
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number of immigrants that a country can attract and on the population 
size that is to be tolerated. 
If there is a sufficiently large supply of A’s who are willing to immigrate 
under optimal conditions, and of B’s  who would immigrate even under 
the solution preferred by the current population, then it is always possible 
for  B’s  to  bribe the initial  group of  A’s  into implementing  the  GNP- 
maximizing immigration policy. To see this, denote by R:  the surplus that 
goes to each A under the GNP-maximizing strategy, and by R,* the surplus 
that goes to each B under the GNP-maximizing strategy. Denote by  Rk 
the surplus that goes to each A under the current-population-preferred 
solution, and analogously by RL  for B’s. Also, let p* and p’ be the equilib- 
rium proportions under the two regimes. The proof that transfers exist, 
which make all better off, follows. 
Since the average person is better off when GNP is maximized, it must 
be true that 
R*,p* +  R,*(l - p*) >  Rip’+  Ri(1 - p’), 
or that 
(R:-  RL)(1 - p’)  > (R: - RZ)p*. 
This implies that 
B, +  B  A, 
A’ 
A, + B, +  B’ 
where A, and B, and are the inital numbers of A’s  and B’s  and where A 
and B are added to obtain p’ in the population. If equation (19) holds, 
then it must also be true that 
(RZ- R;)(B, +  B) > (Rk - R:)A,. 
But this condition says that if each B pays R,*  -  R,,  this will compensate 
every initial A for the loss in moving to the GNP-maximizing solution 
instead  of  that  chosen by  the initial population.  However, any  B who 
would immigrate when there are p’ A’s  will certainly move when there are 
p* A’s.  Also, if there is a sufficient number of A’s  who are willing to immi- 
grate under optimal conditions without compensation, the p*  equilibrium 
can be achieved. This completes the proof. 
3.7  The Empirical Case for Diversity 
Theory suggests a way  by  which having a diverse population can en- 
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communication  is hindered when everyone does not speak the same lan- 
guage. Do the gains from diversity outweigh the costs? 
To determine whether the argument for diversity has any empirical sub- 
stance, the 1990 census of the United States (1 percent sample) was used. 
Data are provided  on place of birth, ancestry, English fluency, language 
spoken at home, and standard variables such as age, education, race, and 
sex. 
It is possible to get a sense of how reasonable the diversity argument is 
by  considering  the  largest  non-English-speaking  group  in  the  United 
States, namely Spanish speakers. Forty-eight percent of those in the 1990 
census who were born outside the United States are Spanish speakers. Of 
those, 55 percent report that they speak English well or very well, which 
will be defined as fluent. Almost all of the native-born population, which 
is over 90 percent of the United States, speaks English as its first language. 
Few in this group speak Spanish. Those who do are, for the most part, 
children of Spanish-speaking immigrants. Thus, for all intents and pur- 
poses, communication does not occur between a native-born American 
and a Spanish-speaking immigrant unless the immigrant is fluent in En- 
glish. This means that GZ  = 0 and G,* = .55. 
A necessary condition for the diversity case is that trade between an A 
and a B results in greater expected surplus than that between an A and an 
A. Defining A's  to be all of the English-speaking, native-born population 
and B's  to be the Spanish-speaking immigrants, it is necessary then that 
or that 
(20)  O(B, - A,)  >  l/G,*. 
Given that GZ  = .55, equation (20) can be written as 
(21)  O(B, - A,)  >  1.82. 
Unless the gains from trading across groups exceeds the normalized  1.82, 
within-group interaction dominates between-group interaction. 
Now, equation (21) is a very difficult condition to meet. To see this, 
consider a quite extreme situation. Suppose, first, that immigrants have 
neither more nor less information than do native-born Americans, so that 
(B, - B,)  = (A, -  A,) = 1. Suppose further that information  is almost 
completely disjoint, with only 10 percent overlap, so that (B, -  A,) = 1.9. 
This assumption is very favorable to the diversity case. Also suppose that 
almost all of the information that each side possesses is relevant  to the 
other side. Specifically, A's  find all of the information between A, and A, 
relevant  and 90 percent of the information between A,  and B, relevant. 
Then the relevance parameter over the interval B, -  A, is Diversity and Immigration  133 
0  =  1(1/1.9) +  .9(.9/1.9)  =  .9526. 
Under these circumstances, 
O(B, - A,)  = (.9526)(1.9)  =  1.81. 
Trade between unlike types is not sufficiently valuable to satisfy condition 
(20). The expected value of diversity is negative. 
Intuitively, since only about half of the immigrants can communicate 
with the native-born population, each actual trade between an immigrant 
and a native needs to be worth almost twice as much as that between two 
natives in order to make the value of diversity positive. It is difficult to 
imagine that the value of the typical trade between native born and immi- 
grant is almost twice that of the typical trade between two natives. Al- 
though possible, the conditions under which diversity pays are very strict. 
The main reason for this somewhat negative conclusion is that Spanish- 
speaking immigrants are not very likely to learn English. Were G,* close 
to 1, the requirement  in equation (20) would be much easier to satisfy. 
This suggests that it is useful to look empirically at how G*, B, -  A,, and 
0 vary across groups. The data in the census files allow us to do this. 
3.7.1  Communication 
Groups differ greatly in their fluency rates. Table 3.1 reports fluency and 
education levels among immigrants by  region of ancestry. Not surpris- 
ingly, immigrants from the British Empire have the highest rate of English 
fluency. Latin Americans, who constitute the largest group of immigrants, 
have the lowest fluency rate. 
More evidence can be presented on variations in G* by group. Table 3.2 
reports the coefficients on country dummies from a logit that has as its 
dependent variable FLUENT, a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent re- 
ported that he or she spoke English very well or well. The logit is run on 
the sample of individuals living in the United  States in  1990 who were 
born outside the country and are five years of age or older. Excluded are 
individuals whose native or only language is English. Thus, Canadians, 
Australians, and the British are out of the sample. (Of course, by the G,* 
criterion, Canadians are ideal immigrants. They may fall short by the dis- 
jointness criterion.) This leaves 147,756 observations. 
The right-hand variables include age, years in the United States, and 
place of birth dummies for the countries listed in table 3.2. These countries 
are the largest suppliers of immigrants, and they are listed in rank order 
in table 3.2. 
First note that 14 of the 18 coefficients are negative. Because the sample 
size is so large, all coefficients are estimated with great precision. Statisti- 
cal significance is not an issue. Relative to the base group, which in this 
case are those who immigrated from a country not listed in table 3.2, these 
immigrants  are less likely to become fluent in English. This is another Table 3.1  Fluency and Education among Immigrants by Region of Ancestry 
Country  Mean 
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Table 3.2  Fluency Logit Analysis 
Country 
Coefficient  Change in 
in Logit  Probability 
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Note: N = 147,756; log likelihood = -72,679;  overall fluency rate = .68. 
manifestation of the point made in Lazear (forthcoming). Since these im- 
migrants are from the largest groups, they are the immigrants most likely 
to encounter individuals with their own backgrounds and therefore are 
the least likely to learn English. 
More important for the purpose here is  that  there is  wide variation 
across  groups.  Germans  have  a  predicted  fluency  probability  of  .92, 
whereas Mexicans with the same characteristics have a predicted fluency 
probability of .37. Older immigrants are less likely to be fluent, consistent 
with standard human capital predictions. Also, the probability increases 
by  about two percentage points for every additional year that an immi- 
grant is in the United States. 
3.7.2  Overlap 
The diversity argument relies on the assumption that immigrants have 
different cultural experiences than native-born Americans  and thereby 
bring new information to the table. But immigrants are not all the same. 
Some have backgrounds that are very similar to Americans; others are 
quite different. Although this is difficult to quantify, it is possible to shed 
some light on the issue by analyzing the ancestry of the American popula- 136  Edward P.  Lazear 
tion. These proportions can then be compared to our current flow of im- 
migrants. 
Table 3.3 reports the ancestry of a 1/1000 sample of native-born Ameri- 
cans in the 1990 census. The obvious finding from table 3.3 is that about 
60 percent of  native-born  Americans  have Western  European ancestry. 
Excluding  those  who  did  not  specify  or who  listed  U.S. ancestry,  the 
second-largest  group consists  of  African  Americans.  The third  largest 
group comes from Eastern Europe, followed by  Latin American ancestry. 
The last column of table 3.3 reports place of birth among the stock of 
immigrants in  1990. Latin Americans are the largest group, followed by 
Western Europeans and then by Asians (from East and Southeast Asia). 
Asian ancestry accounts for less than 1 percent of the native-born popula- 
tion, whereas  Latin American  ancestry accounts for about 5 percent  of 
native-born Americans. Western Europeans account for 60 percent of the 
American population.  Adding immigrants  to the native born drives the 
Latin American proportion up to around 8 percent and the Asian propor- 
tion up to around 3 percent. 
Table 3.3  Ancestry among Native-Born Americans in 1990 
Frequency in  Frequency of 
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The diversity argument suggests that our current immigration policy 
does not minimize overlap. By the disjointness criterion, the United States 
admits too many Western Europeans and possibly too many Latin Ameri- 
cans. Asians seem to be the only large group of immigrants that are not 
already a large part of the American base. 
Taken literally, diversity implies that we are accepting the wrong people. 
For example, underrepresented are North African immigrants. They are 
the smallest group in the current American population, and there are a 
significant number of potential immigrants, especially in Egypt, Morocco, 
and Algeria from which to draw. Indeed, the diversity argument points to 
a very different immigration policy than the one that is currently in place. 
Rather than selecting immigrants based on the existence of relatives in 
the United States, diversity would be served better by doing the opposite. 
Countries whose residents have the most relatives in the United States are 
the ones least likely to bring in cultural diversity. 
3.7.3  Relevance 
The empirical analogue of relevance is somewhat difficult to define. One 
possibility is that relevance may be related to education. Highly educated 
immigrants, or at least those with education levels equivalent to those of 
natives, are more likely to have relevant information than those with much 
less education. It is unlikely that the details about a particular  form of 
agriculture no longer practiced in the United States are as relevant as in- 
formation on a new agriculture technique that has been used elsewhere 
but is not yet practiced in the United States. 
It is useful, therefore, to return to table 3.1 and to examine education 
level by region of origin. It is true, of course, that years of schooling have 
country-specific meaning. Variations in educational quality and subject 
matter are likely to be significant across countries. Still, the averages may 
be instructive. 
Somewhat surprisingly, North Africans top the list on average educa- 
tion level. This is almost certainly a result of selective admission. Few and 
only highly educated North Africans have been successful at obtaining 
permission to come to the United States. Country-specific evidence is pre- 
sented in table  3.4, which reports  educational attainment (for those no 
longer in school) by country of origin for large suppliers of immigrants. 
Immigrants from Mexico have the lowest level of education, and those 
from India and Taiwan have the highest. Indeed, the highly educated im- 
migrant groups have levels of education that are substantially above the 
average level among native-born Americans. In 1990, native-born Ameri- 
cans who were not currently enrolled in school and were older than six 
years old had average levels of education equal to 12.27 years with a stan- 
dard deviation of 3.08 years. 
Again, the differences in education between source countries is as likely 138  Edward P.  Lazear 
Table 3.4  Mean Levels of Education by Place of Birth 
Variable  Observations 
Overall  151,888 
Mexico  32,618 
Non-Mexico Spanish speaking  23,599 
China  3,967 
Philippines  7,104 
Vietnam  3,167 
Italy  5,618 
Korea  3,181 
India  3,103 
Germany  6,514 
Poland  3,129 
Russia  2,405 
Taiwan  1,500 
Japan  2,541 
Iran  1,283 
Portugal  1,549 
Greece  1,575 
Laos  837 










































to reflect immigration policy as it is to reflect inherent differences in educa- 
tional systems or levels. This may be  an important point by  itself. The 
characteristics of immigrants in the United  States are as likely to reflect 
the effects of selective immigration policy as they are to reflect the charac- 
teristics of  the underlying  populations  from  which  the  individuals are 
drawn. A policy that is more lenient toward country C than country B 
will end up with a less qualified pool of immigrants from C than from B, 
sometimes even when the qualifications of C’s are generally higher than 
those of B’s. 
The importance of immigration policy in filtering out different groups 
of immigrants can be seen quite clearly by  comparing immigrants from 
North Africa, whose average education level is 14.1 years, with those from 
Japan, whose average education level is 13.3  years. The difference observed 
in the United States between these groups reverses the patterns observed 
in the native populations and reflects the extreme difficulty of gaining ad- 
mission to the United States from North Africa. 
3.8  Clustering 
As mentioned above, the probability of encountering like or unlike indi- 
viduals is endogenous. In a country that is already as diverse as the United 
States, it is possible, through geographic mobility, to affect the population Diversity and Immigration  139 
with whom trade occurs. Individuals cluster with others of their own type. 
This is most easily seen by comparing the variable CNTYPCT to the pro- 
portion of immigrants in the United States. This variable, discussed in 
Lazear (forthcoming), measures the proportion of a county’s population 
that is made up of persons who were born in the particular individual’s 
native country. 
If immigrants were spread randomly throughout the United States, then 
the proportion of one’s own countrymen encountered would be unrelated 
to place of residence. Every county would be a microcosm of the United 
States. For example, 1.7 percent of the people living in the United States 
in 1990 were born in Mexico. Were they spread randomly throughout the 
United States, then the average CNTYPCT observed for Mexicans living 
in the United States would be .017. 
Conversely, if  Mexican-born immigrants  were completely segregated, 
most counties would have no Mexicans and a few counties would be 100 
percent Mexican born. Since CNTYPCT is defined for a specific individ- 
ual, every Mexican-born immigrant would have a value of CNTYPCT 
equal to one. That is, every Mexican-born immigrant would reside in a 
county that consisted entirely of persons born in Mexico. 
In  fact, the mean value of  CNTYPCT among Mexican-born  immi- 
grants is .146, much larger than the .017 value that would prevail were 
Mexican-born  immigrants  sprinkled  randomly  throughout  the  United 
States. Thus, Mexican immigrants tend to live in more immigrant inten- 
sive communities than do natives. The same is true for other large immi- 
grant groups. 
The effect of clustering can be examined in another way. A logit identi- 
cal to that in table 3.2 was run, except that CNTYPCT was included. The 
coefficient is negative and large. Nonfluent immigrants move to counties 
with high proportions of individuals from their own countries and they 
are less likely to learn English. The decision on where to locate is endo- 
genous,  and  the  country  coefficients are  pushed  toward  zero  when 
CNTYPCT is included. Taking into account the residential decision re- 
duces the differences between groups because the least-fluent groups are 
most  likely to locate in highly  segregated communities. But immigrant 
groups that segregate pass on fewer of the gains from diversity to the na- 
tive population. 
3.8.1  Diversity Reconsidered 
When fluency rates are .55, it is virtually impossible to make a case for 
diversity. But as the fluency rate rises, the diversity argument makes more 
sense. Let us consider North African immigrants, whose fluency rate is at 
.92. Substitution into equation (20) implies that diversity is favored when 140  Edward P.  Lazear 
Now, suppose that 75 percent of what North Africans know overlaps 
completely  with the native-born  American  population.  Suppose further 
that the amount of knowledge possessed by natives and by North Africans 
is the same. Finally, suppose that half of the disjoint information is rele- 
vant to native-born Americans. Then, B, = 1.25, A, = 0, and 
0  =  l(Ul.25) +  .5(.25/1.25)  =  .9, 
so that 
which exceeds the required  1.087. If these assumptions are valid, then di- 
versity, brought about through immigration of North Africans, would be 
welfare improving to the native population. 
The lesson here is that communication between natives and immigrants 
is the crucial parameter. Unless communication is high, it is virtually im- 
possible  to argue in favor of an immigrant group on the basis of gains 
from diversity. As a practical  matter, this means English fluency. Since 
very few of the native-born American population can be fluent in a large 
number of other languages, it is necessary that all residents speak a com- 
mon language. 
Of course, it is possible for trade to occur without direct communica- 
tion. Translators can be used and points of contact between different types 
of individuals can be minimized. But doing this negates the diversity argu- 
ment almost by default. An impersonal market, coupled with a few trans- 
lators, works well to ensure that French wine adorns the tables of Ameri- 
can restaurants. But the French vintners need  not be U.S.  residents for 
this to occur. The gains from having French vintners teach Californians 
how to make wine are reaped  only when direct communication  between 
the two groups occurs. 
Additionally,  education and fluency are related. Immigrants, not cur- 
rently in school, who report that they are fluent in English have average 
levels of  education equal to 11.8 years, whereas those who are not fluent 
in English have an average education level equal to 7.3 years. Thus, rele- 
vance, defined by education level, and communication are likely to be pos- 
itively related. 
Finally, subsequent generations have been ignored. Since virtually all of 
the children of immigrants are fluent in English, the concerns that were 
raised  in previous  sections about English  fluency are lessened.  On the 
other hand, children of immigrants who grow up in the United States are 
less likely to have knowledge and skills that differ from (other) third and 
subsequent  generation  Americans.  Thus,  communication  is  enhanced 
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3.8.2  Balanced Immigration 
The empirical evidence suggest that diversity is enhanced by balanced 
immigration. Even if one accepts the diversity argument, diversity is useful 
only when English fluency among immigrants is high. Theory (see Lazear 
forthcoming) and evidence suggest that individuals who come from coun- 
tries that make up a small part of the U.S. population are most likely to 
learn English. 
Further, balanced immigration, especially from groups that are not al- 
ready  well  represented  in  the  U.S. population,  provides  the  greatest 
amount of disjointness. If we  take the diversity argument seriously, it im- 
plies that welfare is enhanced when immigrants come from a large number 
of underrepresented countries. This suggests that the current policy, which 
favors relatives of current residents, hinders rather than helps diversity. 
Since education is a characteristic that can be screened and selected, 
there is no obvious reason why countries should be favored or penalized 
on the basis of the average level of education among their immigrants to 
the United States. Even though immigrants from Mexico have the lowest 
average  level  of  educational  attainment,  nothing  prevents  the  United 
States from having a policy that favors highly educated Mexican immi- 
grants, if educated immigrants are desired. 
Indeed, the lesson learned from this analysis is that current immigration 
policy is off  target if the diversity argument is accepted. Current policy 
that favors immigrants who have relatives in the United States may have 
other virtues, but it is  likely to grant resident  status to those who have 
significant overlap with the current population, who have low rates of En- 
glish fluency, and who suffer on the relevance criterion as well. 
3.9  Conclusion 
A diversity argument can be made for immigration. The desire for diver- 
sity is expressed in terms of gains that can be realized by the interaction 
of individuals who have different backgrounds. Taken literally, the case for 
diversity is strongest when individuals who differ from the majority confer 
larger gains from trade on majority members than majority members re- 
ceive from interacting with their own kind. This argument implies that 
desirable immigrants come from cultures that are disjoint from current 
American culture and from cultures that are relevant to Americans. Most 
important, it is necessary that individuals can communicate with one an- 
other, As a practical matter, communication requires a high rate of English 
fluency among immigrants. 
Current immigration policy favors the relatives of  U.S. residents.  In 
part, as a result of clustering, this policy has resulted in low fluency rates, 142  Edward P.  Lazear 
which reduces the welfare gains from immigration. Also, because more- 
educated immigrants are likely to do better on the relevance criterion and 
because education and English fluency are linked, diversity gains are likely 
to be  positively  related  to the education  levels of  the immigrant  stock. 
Related, the results  suggest that our immigration  policy has resulted in 
differences in the characteristics  of immigrants that reflect the effects of 
selection as much as they do the underlying characteristics of the popula- 
tions from which the immigrants are drawn. 
The current policy does not lead to an immigrant flow that enhances 
diversity. Instead, certain countries and cultures are favored at the expense 
of other countries and cultures. Furthermore, the countries that are the 
largest suppliers of immigrants are not among the best by the criteria of 
disjointness, relevance, or communication. A policy that sold immigration 
slots or one that ranked the specific characteristics of the individual immi- 
grants would be more likely to enhance diversity. 
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